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Yel'tsin's Chechnya
By SUZANNE CROW
The Wall Street Journal Europe
The invasion of Chechnya, now in its second month, has prompted a great deal of 
questioning in the West about Russian President Boris Yel'tsin's suitability as his 
country's steward into what US President Bill Clinton has called "market-democracy." 
Clinton and leaders in Europe have invested political and real capital into Russian 
reform and have chosen to embody their idea of Russian reform in the person of Boris 
Yel'tsin. Now, after seeing nightly pictures of the bombing of Chechnya in full swing with 
indiscriminate damage, Western leaders find themselves in the awkward position of 
supporting a leader who appears belligerent, irrational, incompetent, and perhaps 
dangerous. The only alternative, according to this logic, would be the unpleasant one of 
retracting support for Yel'tsin, whom they continue to equate with reform.
In fact, though, it is time to face the possibility that Boris Yel'tsin is not the best man for 
Russia. Attempts to ignore his most recent transgression and to consider it an internal 
matter will only add Chechnya to the growing list of Western failures to respond to 
bloodshed in the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. It would make the continuation of 
Western aid to Russia in the near term look foolish. And, most threateningly, it would 
send another signal to Russia and elsewhere that Western leaders are willing to tolerate 
virtually anything to avoid taking difficult decisions in this challenging post-Cold War 
period. As is shown by Chechnya--the stepchild of Western mishandling of Russia --
such craven behavior promises only similar challenges in the future.
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Yel'tsin's Record
If anyone had any lingering doubts about the shortsightedness of putting all bets on 
Yel'tsin, Chechnya should finally sweep them away. Supporting individuals rather than 
paths of reform is risky business. In the case of Boris Yel'tsin, the policy was also ill-
informed: Sufficient evidence was available before Chechnya that Yel'tsin was prone to 
skirting the law in domestic politics and in foreign policy.
In many ways--outlined below--the Chechnya operation reflects behavioral patterns 
clearly displayed by Yel'tsin in the past. The Russian president is acting impulsively, 
relying on a small circle of advisers, and resorting quickly to the use of military force to 
obtain political ends.
Impulsive rule. Perhaps Boris Yel'tsin's most distinctive characteristic as a leader is his 
proclivity to be guided by impulse and improvisation. He has developed a reputation for 
taking decisions quickly and without contemplation, sometimes even surprising his 
advisers.(1)
The decision to invade Chechnya seems to have been impulsive, taken on short notice. 
Commanders and troops were not equipped with maps of Grozny--neither ordinary ones 
nor electronic ones--for use in targetting bombs.(2) Ill-prepared, they were in some 
cases unwilling to fight. No time was taken for putting together a reliable force or for 
convincing soldiers of the purpose of their mission. The necessity for this should have 
been obvious given the tumult in the Russian armed forces, the upheavals in their 
country, and the fact that the war which they were expected to prosecute was against 
both civilians and fellow-countrymen, against both Chechens and ethnic Russians.
Observers are still speculating about why Yel'tsin chose this course of action. Searches 
for a pressing reason come up empty-handed: Chechnya's declaration of 
independence, the breakdown of law and order, and the defiance toward Moscow were 
old news, dating back to 1991. Explanations that the war was necessary to hold the 
Russian Federation together cannot be reconciled with the fact that Chechnya's pre-
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invasion intransigence posed no real threat of breaking Russia apart. An alternative 
theory holds that the passage of an oil pipeline through Chechnya necessitated a 
conclusive crackdown on the republic's independence drive. This also does not explain 
the failure to plan and prepare the operation properly.
A somewhat more convincing explanation holds that the proximate cause was a dispute 
between the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and segments of the security apparatus, 
possibly the Ministry of Interior (MVD), over the use of assets in the most recent failed 
undercover operation to bring down Chechen President Dzhokar Dudayev. According to 
this thinking, the invasion would provide a decisive conclusion to the entire Chechnya 
affair, enveloping and smothering the MOD-MVD dispute. However, this theory leaves 
one wondering why an MOD-MVD dispute, which would have constituted a small 
wrinkle in Russia's already rocky political landscape, called for a large-scale invasion, 
even if that invasion had been swift and victorious.
More persuasive are reports coming in from Kremlin watchers that Yel'tsin, for various 
reasons, had come to desire a robust show of force and a quick victory in something 
and that Chechnya, whose declaration of independence had long been a pebble in the 
Russian president's shoe, presented itself as the convenient victim.
This theory seems to work best because it takes into account the Russian president's 
growing frustration with the political and economic situation in Russia, his persistently 
declining popularity just over one year before the June 1996 presidential elections, and 
the failure of Russia's international relations to develop the way he would like. Yel'tsin 
had become overheated on a number of domestic and international issues in the weeks 
before the invasion. His sharp warning about the emergence of a "Cold Peace" at the 
summit meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe during the 
first week in December betrayed a high level of frustration. Yel'tsin had also run into 
obstacles with the Duma over the state budget. Considering the fact that no real 
progress had emerged in Russia's affairs after so many difficulties, Yel'tsin was showing 
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signs that he desperately wanted to demonstrate that he was in control and that at least 
one of Russia's many problems could be vanquished.
A Small Circle of Advisers. The next piece in the Chechnya puzzle concerns Yel'tsin's 
habit of giving responsibility to those who are loyal to him but who do not necessarily 
possess other recognizable qualifications. This tendency, which can be found in virtually 
any government around the world, was particularly pronounced in the Soviet system --
the system in which Boris Yel'tsin received his political education.
Reports from Russians and Western observers alike agree that Yel'tsin relied on too 
limited council over Chechnya. According to former Acting Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar, 
there were but three key advisers: Security Council Secretary Oleg Lobov, Deputy 
Prime Minister Nikolai Yegorov, and Defense Minister Pavel Grachev.(3) Yel'tsin's 
advisers, reading his mood, told him what they thought he wanted to hear: Invading 
Chechnya would solve a number of problems. One can only hypothesize that they 
portrayed the plan as nothing but achievable, probably at little material or human cost 
on the Russian side, and possibly in a short span of time.
The Use of Force. Yel'tsin's use of force to achieve political ends is nothing new and 
should surprise no one. The use of military power to settle the score with his political 
foes in the city of Moscow is a well-known example. Russia's military operations in 
Georgia, Moldova, and Tajikistan were scarcely concealed and have also been well-
documented.(4)
The way in which military operations were undertaken and then denied is also similar. In 
Georgia, Russian officials attempted to blame participation by Russian armed forces 
personnel in insurrections on unauthorized freelancing and mercenary activity. Similarly, 
Yel'tsin placed the blame for continued bombing of Chechen civilian targets, following 
his orders for it to stop, on military officers who were reportedly out of control. However, 
in the case of both Georgia and Chechnya, these explanations don't withstand scrutiny. 
The clear pattern of military involvement in Georgia required clearcut coordination with 
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the Russian leadership at the highest levels. Similarly, Yel'tsin's orders for a halt to 
bombing of civilians in Chechnya were disingenuous from the start: Unable to pinpoint 
targets accurately, the military operation could not have discriminated between civilian 
and military facilities.(5) Soldiers, already bitter about being placed in this tricky military 
situation unprepared, seemed to view Yel'tsin's order as laughable.
Yel'tsin in Perspective
Russia's first post-communist president, Yel'tsin was also the last leader of the Russian 
Socialist Federated Soviet Republic. As such, he shouldn't be expected to serve as 
anything more than a transitional leader, with one foot in the past and one foot in the 
present. This may seem an overly charitable analysis of the Russian president's 
leadership in the wake of the unwarranted bloodshed in Chechnya, but it is valid 
nonetheless. One really can expect only the minimum from a man who learned politics 
in the old school and who succeeded in the brutal communist system. That Yel'tsin 
rebelled against that system is his single best qualification for staying on after its 
demise; little more recommends him as the steward of Russian reforms.
To be sure, Yel'tsin looks like democracy's "best bet" when considered with such 
personalities as Liberal Democratic Party Leader Vladimir Zhirinovsky, the outspoken 
General Aleksandr Lebed', the commander of the 14th Army in Moldova, or even Afghan 
war hero and former vice president Aleksandr Rutskoi. Yet as more liberal and reform-
minded presidential hopefuls--such as Yegor Gaidar or Grigori Yavlinsky--begin showing 
the initiative to oppose the Chechnya invasion, Yel'tsin no longer resembles a reformer, 
much less a uniquely qualified one.
Cast in this light, Yel'tsin emerges as a transitional leader whose mistakes, in hindsight, 
look unsurprising. This perspective is not meant to excuse the Russian leader of his 
transgressions or to say they should be treated lightly. Rather, it is intended to 
encourage a bit more skepticism in Western expectations of Yel'tsin, of his ability to 
bring reform forward, and most importantly, of his readiness to act as a good partner in 
the Western club. 
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Postscript
It is, in a way, disappointing to many who have followed Russian interventions in the 
affairs of its neighbors for the past few years, and who have tried to convince policy 
makers of the need to react and impose a clear cost, to see the rapid and plentiful 
attention given to the Chechnya invasion in the West. When Russia initiated or 
exacerbated conflicts in non-Russian territories--Georgia, Moldova, Tajikistan, and 
Nagorno-Karabakh--its interventions did not attract much notice in Western capitals, 
much less in the Western media. Now, in a situation in which Russia can claim a ready 
excuse (ostensibly keeping internal order and maintaining the country's territorial 
integrity), challenges from Europe and gradually from the United States for a halt to the 
violence are made on somewhat weaker ground.
The West's preference to condone Russian misbehavior early in the "Near Abroad" 
produced an incentive for additional misconduct of the type evident in Moscow in 
October 1993 and in Chechnya today. Advisers close to Yel'tsin openly admit that the 
West's silence undermined the positions of liberals and eliminated their braking 
influence on such types of behavior. (The best example is the reincarnation of Foreign 
Minister Andrei Kozyrev as a traditionalist and now, unsurprisingly, an ardent defender 
of the Chechnya invasion.) Sources close to Yel'tsin and Kozyrev say that both are 
stunned by the Western reaction to the invasion. They had been taught to expect 
silence, if not support.
Notes:
1 Examples include his sudden decision to enter into a new arms control agreement 
with the United States in early 1993 and his decision to recognize Macedonia during a 
state visit to Bulgaria in mid-1993.
2 Interview with Alexei Pushkov, Deputy Editor-In-Chief of Moscow News, on 11 January 
1995, in Brussels.
3 Los Angeles Times, 4 January 1995.
4 Fiona Hill and Pamela Jewett, Back in the USSR: Russia's Intervention in the Internal 
Affairs of the Former Soviet Republics and the Implications for US Policy toward 
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Russia(John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University: Strengthening 
Democratic Institutions Project, January 1994).
5 Op. cit. interview with Alexei Pushkov.
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